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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The following parties or attorneys are now or have
been interested in this litigation or any related proceedings.
1.

First Security Mortgage Company was the named

defendant when this litigation commenced.

On June 3, 1988,

Judge Pat B. Brian entered an Order whereby Leucadia Financial
Corporation was substituted for First Security Mortgage Company
for all purposes.

(R.844-46) Leucadia Financial Corporation

is asserting the rights of First Security Mortgage Company in
this appeal.
2.

Craig L. Taylor, Esq., previously appeared as

counsel for First Security Mortgage Company prior to the
above-mentioned substitution of parties.
3.

All other parties are reflected in the caption,

and all other counsel have entered their appearance.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from the Order of Partial Summary
Judgment signed by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on
February 1, 1988, the Final Judgment and Decree of Specific
Performance, signed by the Honorable Pat B. Brian on May 6,
1988 and the Order, signed by the Honorable Pat B. Brian on
May 6, 1988. All of these orders and judgments were entered in
the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, Utah.
This appeal was filed on June 3, 1988 with the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah Code Annotated
(1988).

On August 22, 1988, the Supreme Court notified the

parties that the case was poured-over to the Court of Appeals
for disposition.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in ordering specific

performance where plaintiff Kelleyfs tender of performance was
defective because conditional and therefore insufficient to
enable Kelley to bring this action?
2.

Did the trial court err in ordering specific

performance where an unconditional tender of performance was
not made by the closing date?

-i -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent William R. Kelley, Jr. ("Kelley")
commenced this action in the Third Judicial District Court on
September 22, 1987, against Defendant-Appellant First Security
Mortgage Company ("First Security").

In this action, Kelley

requested a declaratory judgment for the interpretation of
rights, status and legal relationship under an Earnest Money
Sales Agreement ("Agreement"), sought a decree of specific
performance requiring First Security to convey certain property
as contracted in the Agreement, and prayed for damages for
breach of the Agreement.

(R.l-11)

Thereafter, on November 10, 1987, First Security filed
a Motion to Dismiss and for Attorneys1 Fees.

(R.72-73) In

response, Kelley filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
November 27, 1987. (R.137-39)

The Court entered its Order

granting Kelley Partial Summary Judgment on February 3, 1988.
(R.562-64)

This Order granted KelleyTs request for a decree of

specific performance and retained jurisdiction over the matter
to determine whether Kelley was entitled to an abatement of the
purchase price and damages.

(R.562-64)

First Security filed a

1. First Security was the named defendant when this litigation
commenced. By order of the Court, Leucadia Financial
Corporation was substituted for First Security and is asserting
the rights of First Security in this appeal. (R.844-46)
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Motion to Amend Judgment (R.343-344), an Objection to Proposed
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (R.345-46), and a
Motion for Reconsideration (R.907), all of which were denied by
the Court.
First Security filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
relating to Kelley?s claims for punitive damages and on May 6,
1988, the Court entered its Order which, among other things,
granted summary judgment in favor of First Security.
(R.812-14)

On the same day, the Court found the parties had

otherwise settled all claims relating to the amount of damages
to be awarded Kelley and entered its Final Judgment and Decree
of Specific Performance.

(R.815-18)

Leucadia Financial

Corporation ("Leucadia") was substituted for First Security on
June 3, 1988 for purposes of appeal concerning the decree of
specific performance and all orders or judgments.

(R.844-46)

In that capacity, Leucadia filed its notice of appeal on
June 3, 1988.

(R.847-49)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts before the District Court were not
disputed.

They are as follows:
1.

The Agreement Between The Parties.

On or about February 20, 1987, First Security Mortgage
Company, as seller, and William R. Kelley, Jr., as buyer,
executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the purchase of

real property, a copy of which is Appendix 1 to this brief.
(R.14-22)

Pursuant to this Agreement, Kelley agreed to

purchase and First Security agreed to convey title to certain
property situated at 320 West Snows Lane, Park City, Utah
("Subject Property").

(R.14)

There were several addenda to the Agreement which
altered the Agreement only by extending the time for closing.
In the first addendum to the Agreement, the parties agreed to
extend the closing to April 20, 1987.

(R.18)

Thereafter, the

parties extended the closing date to on or before June 1, 1987
(R.19); on or before July 1, 1987 (R.20); on or before
August 31, 1987 (R.21).

By letter dated September 4, 1987,

the closing date was extended to September 15, 1987 (R.114);
by letter dated September 14, 1987, the time for closing was
extended until September 22, 1987 (R.116).
2.

The Terms Of The Agreement.

The parties bargained for the following terms in their
Agreement:
a)

The property is sold "as is" without warranty

with title to be conveyed by special warranty deed.

(R.16)

b) Agreement is conditioned on seller furnishing
good and marketable title to the property as evidenced by a
current policy of title insurance.

(R.16 1T3)

c)
of the property.
d)

Seller to provide a current certified survey
(R.18)
In the event of a title problem, Buyer is to

give Seller written notice of his objections to title.
Thereafter, Seller is required to cure the defects to which
Buyer has objected, if such can be done through escrow at
closing.

If the defects are not curable through an escrow

agreement at closing, the Buyer has the option of waiving the
defects and proceeding with the closing or he may require the
Seller to return the earnest money deposit and the Agreement
will be null and void.
e)

(R.15 UG)

In the event there is loss or damage to the

property between the date of the Agreement and the date of
closing by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or
acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage exceeds ten
percent of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may either
proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to
repair or replace damaged property prior to closing, or declare
this Agreement null and void.

If damage to property is less

than ten percent of the purchase price and Seller agrees in
writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and
replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction
shall proceed as agreed.

(R.17 TIP)

f) With regard to the extension of closing
dates, time is of the essence of this Agreement.
g)

This instrument constitutes the entire

Agreement of the parties.
3.

(R.17 1TQ)

(R.17 UL)

The Dispute.

At the time this Agreement was executed, both Kelley
and First Security understood the Subject Property to include
land which was enclosed by fences, a stream, a spring and a
pond.

(R.276)

Shortly after the Agreement was executed, First

Security, in accordance with the Agreement, had a survey
conducted of the Subject Property.

Through this survey, First

Security discovered that the Quit-Claim Deed by which it
claimed its interest in the property contained an erroneous
property description which did not coincide with the natural
boundaries of the property.

(R.143)

This faulty property

description was a result of a prior erroneous survey and
previous conveyances of the property incorporating the
description from the erroneous survey.

(R.81, 150)

The result

of this erroneous description was that the boundary shifted
approximately 15.22 feet to the south such that neither the
spring, the stream nor the pond would be included in the
conveyance contemplated by the Agreement.

_£_

(R.143)

In addition, First Security believes that one or more
of the adjacent landowners came on the property and sawed off a
pipe supplying water to the pond located on the property and
removed fish from the pond.

(R.82)

Consequently, the pond

virtually dried up and the water feeding the pond from the pipe
has been diverted from the property,

(R.82)

First Security attempted to resolve these problems
with the landowners of the adjacent property, but was unable to
do so through negotiation.

(R.357)

Accordingly, First

Security commenced a lawsuit against the landowners to recover
for damages to the property, to compel the determination of any
claims adverse to First Security's title, to establish correct
boundaries, to quiet title to, and to obtain a declaration of
First Security's rights with respect to the property.
(R.23-59)

It became clear, however, that the adjacent

landowners would not resolve the dispute without substantial
litigation which First Security was unwilling to undertake
without reimbursement from Kelley.
4.

(R.114-15)

The Termination Of The Agreement.

By August 31, 1987, the last closing date mutually
agreed to by the parties, neither party had performed nor
tendered performance under the Agreement.

(R.35 9)

On

September 4, 1987, First Security sent Kelley a letter
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indicating that resolution of the boundary dispute and property
damage could not be done through negotiation but, rather, would
require substantial litigation.

(R.114-15)

Accordingly, First

Security offered Kelley the options bargained for in the
Agreement in the event of a dispute rendering title to the
property unmarketable or in the case of damage to property
prior to closing.

Namely, Kelley could either waive the

defects and proceed to closing or First Security would return
the earnest money deposit.

(R. 114-15; R.15 HG; R.17 HP)

Under

these terms, the closing was scheduled for September 15, 1987,
and, at Kelley T s request, later extended until September 22,
1987.

(R.114-15, 116)
On September 22, 1987, however, Kelley declined to

close under either of the options provided in the letter as
required by the Agreement.

(R.119-21)

Instead, Kelley

tendered the down payment in escrow, and stated that such
tender was conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary
dispute, rectifying the property damage, and clearing title
prior to closing.

(R.120)

Appendix 2 to this brief.

A copy of Kelleyfs tender is
Thereafter, First Security orally

offered to extend the closing deadline to October 8, 1987, if,
in accordance with the Agreement, Kelley desired to purchase
the property "as is."

(R.296)

Kelley refused this offer,

however, stating that First Security was obligated to resolve

the disputes and then convey the property to Kelley.

(R.297)

Inasmuch as First Security was unable to repair or replace the
damaged property, and because Kelley did not waive the defects
in the title and close the sale on or before September 22,
1987, but rather, made his tender of down payment conditional,
First Security executed a release of Kelleyfs earnest money
deposit on September 24, 1987.

(R.122-25)

Kelley filed this action on September 22, 1987,
requesting an order of the Court that First Security was
obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, repair or replace
the property, and then convey the property to Kelley.
5.

(R.7)

The Sale Of The Subject Property To Leucadia.

On September 25, 1987, First Security received an
earnest money offer to purchase the Subject Property from
Leucadia, and began negotiating a purchase and sale agreement
with Leucadia. (R.362)

On November 2, 1987, First Security and

Leucadia entered into a binding Earnest Money Sales Agreement
for the sale of the Subject Property.

(R.362)

1987, the Subject Property was sold to Leucadia.

On November 25,
(R.362)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an unconditional
tender of performance is a prerequisite to an action for
specific performance.

In this action, First Security argues

that the lower court erred in ordering specific performance of

the Agreement because Kelley's tender of performance was
conditional on First Security providing a remedy not required
by the Agreement.

Moreover, Kelley failed to make an adequate

tender prior to the expiration of the Agreement on its own
terms.

Accordingly, the lower court's order of specific

performance of the Agreement is erroneous, as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
In reviewing a case disposed of in the District Court
by summary judgment, the reviewing court must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and
affirm the decision only where it appears there is no genuine
dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Themy v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979).
this action, the facts are undisputed.

In

Appellant's contention

is that the District Court erred as a matter of law in ordering
specific performance of the Agreement.
I.

AN UNCONDITIONAL TENDER OF PERFORMANCE IS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO A DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
On several occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has

considered under what circumstances a tender of performance is
sufficient for purposes of ordering specific performance of a
contract.

In response to this query, the Utah Supreme Court
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has repeatedly and consistently held that a complete and
unconditional tender is a prerequisite to an action for
specific performance.
In Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Inc., 622 P.2d 808
(Utah 1981), for example, a purchaser brought an action for
specific performance of a purchase agreement involving two
condominium units entered into between the parties in May,
1977.

The terms of the initial purchase agreement were that

the buyer was to make a cash down payment of 10% and to obtain
a mortgage loan for the remaining 90%.
of the closing was left open.

622 P.2d 809.

The date

In October, 1978, the seller

requested that the purchaser complete the purchase within the
next ten days by depositing the 10% down payment and making
application for the 90% loan.

Plaintiff did not comply with

this letter, but proposed several alternative offers, none of
which was accepted by the defendant.

Id.

Thereafter, the plaintiff made two "tenders of
performance."

In January, 1979, the plaintiff tendered the 10%

down payment but did not state whether she had made application
for the loan for the additional 90%; defendant did not respond
to this tender.

!Ed.

In February, 1979, plaintiff tendered

more money for the two units and required seller to carry a
contract for 90% of the sales price; defendant did not respond
to this tender.

622 P.2d 810.

Thereafter, plaintiff brought

an action for specific performance of the original agreement.
The Court held that the plaintiff did not tender the
performance required by the terms of the agreement and,
accordingly, specific performance was denied.

622 P.2d at 811.

The following year, the Utah Supreme Court explained
why a conditional tender, that is one not in conformance with
the terms of the agreement, is inadequate as a matter of law
for purposes of bringing an action to compel performance:
[With respect to] a contract . . . which
contemplates simultaneous performance by both
parties, such as the Earnest Money agreement
involved in this case, neither party can be said
to be in default (and thus susceptible to a
judgment for damages or a decree for specific
performance) until the other party has tendered
his own performance. . . .
In other words, the
party who desires to use legal process to
exercise his legal remedies under such a contract
must make a tender of his own agreed performance
in order to put the other party in
default. . . . To qualify under this rule, a
tender, such as an offer to pay money, must be
complete and unconditional.
Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. Webb, 645
P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
See also Zionfs Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah
1975) (a tender requires that there be a bona fide,
unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of money due,
coupled with an actual production of the money or its
equivalent); Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974) (to
claim specific performance, a party must either perform or

tender performance in accordance with the covenants in the
contract. )
In this case, Kelleyfs "tender" was not in accordance
with the terms of the Agreement between the parties.

The

Agreement clearly provided the options open to the purchaser in
the event the title to the property was unmarketable:

Where

the defects in title were not curable through an escrow
agreement at closing (e.g., paying money to release liens or
other encumbrances), the purchaser could either waive the
defects and close the sale, or his earnest money deposit would
be returned and the Agreement declared null and void.

(R.15

1FG) Similarly, the options available to the purchaser in the
event of property damage caused by vandalism were provided by
the Agreement:

If the seller agrees to repair or replace the

damaged property the buyer may, at his option, either proceed
to closing or declare the Agreement null and void.

(R.17 HP)

Yet in this case, Kelleyfs tender was expressly
conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary dispute,
clearing title, and repairing or replacing the damaged property
prior to closing, even though Kelley had knowledge that
substantial litigation was required to do so.

(R.120)

Clearly, such a tender was not made in accordance with the
provisions in the Agreement; rather, it was conditioned on

First Security undertaking obligations not provided for in the
Agreement and over which First Security had no control.
By this Agreement, the parties stipulated to what the
remedy would be in case of the failure or inability of First
Security to provide merchantable title.

Such a stipulation is

binding, at least in the absence of bad faith.

E.g., Lanna

v. Greene, 175 Conn. 453, 399 A.2d 837, 842 (1978); Scerbo v.
Robinson, 63 App.Div.2d 1096, 406 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (1978);
Robison v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615, 549 P.2d 274, 276 (1976).
First Security never contemplated assuming the obligation to
cure defects to title that could not be cured through escrow -either before closing, as demonstrated by paragraph G of the
Agreement, or after closing, as demonstrated by its inserting
the "as is" and "without warranty" and "title conveyed by
special warranty deed" language.

By annexing an unwarranted

condition to his tender of performance, Kelley in effect
refused to perform.

See Gerritsen v. Draney, 351 P.2d 667,

673 (Wyo. 1960) (a tender made not in conformity with the
contract is the same as if no tender is made at all); Johnson
v. Goldberg, 130 Cal.App.2d 571, 279 P.2d 131 (1955)
(conditional tender of performance is a refusal to perform).
The parties also, by this Agreement, stipulated to
what the remedy would be in the event of property damage caused
by vandalism.

First Security had no obligation to repair or

replace the damaged property.

Rather, the Agreement provided

that if First Security had the ability to repair the damage and
in fact did repair the damage, then Kelley could proceed with
the Agreement.

However where, as in this case, the correction

of the damaged property was out of First Security's hands, the
only obligation First Security had was to allow for the
termination of the Agreement by its terms.

Again, Kelleyfs

tender of performance was not in conformance with the Agreement
and, therefore, in effect was a refusal to perform.
Gerritsen, 351 P.2d at 673; Johnson, 279 P.2d at 131.
First Security, as a matter of law, was not obligated
to accept Kelley f s tender of performance requiring First
Security to provide a remedy and undertake obligations not
required by the Agreement.

In turn, Kelley f s conditional

tender, as a matter of law, was deficient and therefore an
insufficient basis to enable Kelley to bring an action in
specific performance.

The District Court's order of specific

performance should be reversed.
II.

WHERE TIME IS THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT FAILURE TO
TENDER BY THE CLOSING DATE DESTROYS RIGHT TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.
The second question presented by this appeal, whether

specific performance is appropriate where the Agreement
terminated because the transaction was not closed nor adequate

tender made by the agreed upon date, has also been expressly
considered by the Utah Supreme Court.

To this question, the

Court has stated that where time is made the essence of the
agreement, the parties must make tender by the stated closing
date or both parties will be discharged from their obligations.
In Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v.
Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982), as in this case, the purchasers
brought an action against the seller of real property seeking
specific performance of the sale of the seller's home pursuant
to an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase agreement
signed by the parties.

645 P.2d at 54.

After the contract was

signed but prior to closing, the buyers learned of an
encumbrance on the property.

The buyers insisted that the

encumbrance be satisfied prior to closing, although under the
terms of their contract, such a demand was not the buyer's
right.

645 P.2d at 55.

The parties had agreed upon a closing

date of December 22; neither party made a tender of performance
on or before that date.

645 P.2d at 54.

However, on January

9, 1979, the buyer advised the seller they were "ready and
willing to close on this transaction" provided the seller
cleared the encumbrance.

645 P.2d at 54-55.

The court noted that the tender was, in that
situation, made within the contract period; the court reasoned
that in cases where the executory contract contains no

declaration that time is of the essence, the contract
obligations can continue for some time beyond the stated
closing date.

However, the court made clear this holding was

limited to situations in which there is no time of essence
agreement between the parties:
Where the contract states that time is of the
essence, cases hold that both parties are
discharged from their contract obligations if
neither makes tender by the agreed closing date.
Century 21, 645 P.2d at 55 n.l (citations omitted).
Significantly, the court found that even though made while the
contract was still in effect (due to the lack of a time of
essence clause), the tender was insufficient as a matter of law
because it was conditional on a term not found in the agreement
and declined to order specific performance.

645 P.2d at 56.

The Court's notation that time of essence clauses are
to be strictly enforced is in accord with holdings of other
courts.

Ejg., Nix v. Clary, 640 P.2d 246 (Colo. App. 1981)

(purchasers were not entitled to specific performance as they
failed to tender payment as required by the contract which
provided that time was of the essence and give notice of their
unconditional commitment to be bound by the contract); In re
Gauthier, 493 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1972) (not selected for
official publication) (where time is of essence of a contract,

failure to tender payment when due destroyed right to specific
performance of contract).
In this action, the Agreement provides that "time is
of the essence."
goes on to state:

(R.117 HQ)

Significantly, this provision

"This provision relates only to the

extension of closing date."

(R.117 UQ)

The last extension of

the closing date in this case provided that the closing was to
occur on or before September 22, 1987.

(R.116)

On

September 22, 1987, however, the performance Kelley tendered

was insufficient

as a matter of law because

Kelleyfs

conditional on a term not found in the Agreement.
Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56; see Point I supra.

tender was
See

Because

Kelley did not tender unconditional performance of the
Agreement on or before September 22, 1987, the time of essence
clause of the Agreement caused the Agreement to lapse.

On that

date, both parties were discharged from their obligations and
thus neither party could be said to be in default and
susceptible to judgment for damages or a decree for specific
performance.

See Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56 and at 55 n.l.

Even assuming that despite the time of essence clause,
the Agreement remained open, Kelley never attempted to tender
unconditional performance of the Agreement after the last
extension had expired.

Indeed, First Security offered to allow

closing on October 8, 1987, if Kelley would make an
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unconditional tender of performance.

(R.296)

Again, however,

Kelley refused, stating that First Security was obligated to
provide a remedy to the title and property damage disputes not
provided for in the Agreement.

(R.297)

In fact, when Kelley filed this action on September 22,
1987, he requested an order of the Court that First Security
was obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, rectify the
property damage and then convey the property to Kelley -- which
prayer is consistent with the position Kelley had assumed in
refusing to go forward with the closing.

(R.7)

At some point,

first reflected in the pleadings on November 25, 1987, Kelleyfs
position changed.

In the memorandum in support of KelleyTs

motion for summary judgment (R.140-274), Kelley requests the
court to order First Security to convey "whatever title it has"
to the Subject Property.

(R.181)

Even then, Kelley sought

damages in the form of abatement of the purchase price -- a
remedy not bargained for in the Agreement.
Moreover, by the time Kelley changed his position to
seek conveyance of "whatever title [First Security] has," the
time of essence clause of the Agreement had rendered the
Agreement void.

Indeed, by this time, First Security had

pursued other options in reliance on Kelleyfs failure to tender
appropriate performance on the date set for closing and, in

i a

fact, had entered into an agreement for the sale of the Subject
Property to Leucadia.

(R.362)

The Agreement between First Security and Kelley
provides that with respect to closing dates, time is of the
essence.

As a matter of law, this Agreement expired because

Kelley did not make an unconditional tender of performance by
the last agreed upon closing date, September 22, 1987.

Even if

the Agreement remained open despite the time of essence clause,
Kelley never made an unconditional tender, despite First
Security's willingness to close the deal according to the terms
of the Agreement.

As a matter of law, the Agreement expired by

the failure of Kelley to proffer an unconditional tender.

As

such, the Agreement is incapable of being specifically enforced.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ordering
specific performance of the Agreement for several reasons.
First, Kelley's tender of performance was deficient in that it
required First Security to provide a remedy not required by the
Agreement.

Such a conditional tender is deficient as a matter

of law and is therefore an insufficient basis to enable Kelley
to bring an action in specific performance.

Second, the

agreement between First Security and Kelley provides that with
respect to closing dates, time is of the essence.

As a matter

of law, this Agreement expired because Kelley did not make an

-20-

unconditional tender of performance by the closing date on
September 22, 1987. As such, the Agreement is incapable of
being specifically enforced.

The District Court's order of

specific performance should be reversed.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 1988.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Snow
Kathryn H. Snedaker
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

<>^Attorneyszfor Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellant to be
hand delivered, this 23rd day of November, 1988, to the
following:
David R. Olsen
Charles P. Sampson
Claudia F. Berry
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EARNED MONEY SALES AGRF' /1ENT
Legend

Yes (X)

N<

^ * ^xtr-s^

APPENDIX

1

soor/cg <+/<+$

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire doci

B

REALTOR"

TS2y~Z^ l5~~ " ^ '£
' ^ ^ ^ 3 r z k £^<i

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if present'y attached to the property plumbing.
heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment water heater built-in appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and draperies
and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings installed television antenna wall-to-wall carpets water softener automatic garage door
opener and trans mi tter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs
B INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer s own examination and judgment and not by
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition size location present value future value income
herefrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is ' condition subject to Seller s wayanties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer d.esires
any additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer*
C SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property »"H«ch
has not or will not be remedied prior to closing, (b) all obligations against the property including taxes assessments mortgages liens or other encumbrances
o* any nature shall be brought current on or before closing and (c) the plumbing heating air conditioning and ventilating systems electrical system and appliances
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing
D
CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers knowledge, provided an adequate supply of
water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is to the best of Seller s knowledge m good working order and
Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards
v F ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement but not lest than three (3) days prior to closing
Seller shall provide to Buyer wntten verification as to whether or not any notes mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts ags nst the property require the
consent of the holder of such mstrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and 'or declare the entire balance due in the
event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale then withm three (3) days after notrce of
nonwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving wntten notice
to Seller or Seller's agent In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions
for said "Due on Sale * clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void

/ . TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (1 5) days after Seller s acceptance of this Aoreement but not less than three (31 days prior to closing Buyer
shall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney s opinion or a preliminary title report on the subject property
Buyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seller
or Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title Thereafter. Seller shall be required through escrow at closing, to cure the
defect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing this Agreement shall be null and void at the option
of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form AlTA
policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than
those provided for in said standard form and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer and this Agreement
shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge
I
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. • If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) days
after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting
the property Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent withm three (3) workmo days thereafter. Buyer shall take title subject to such
leases If objection is not remedied within the stated time this Agreement shall be null and void

OOlS
J CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor
new leases entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer

L*gend ; . Yes(X)

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

No<0)

DATE

/g/^z,

The undersigned Buyer.

Mr/L^ry

as EARNEST MONEY the amount of
in the form of Jfc*'•+-*-*>*>

- r - f

/ 4 2 f ^ ^ T

7- State Law
&r£yt*>*tSJj0<nitIltitt^ >vhich shall be deposaed in accordance with applicable

£

(L

hereby deposits with Brokerage
Z l _ Dollars («

Received by

Phone Number

Brokerage

OFFER TO PURCHASE
1

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

The above stated EARNEST MONEY isoiven to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated z\$£&

(r^C**/

in the City of
T~y
County of . ^c;s>r*"'7~
Utah
subject to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utility or other easements or rights of way government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer
in accordance with Section G Said property is more particularly described as _
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
£$3 UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Vacant Lot

D Vacant Acreage

jBj IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Commercial

^Residential

(a)

Included items.

D Other
D Condo

• Other

_

Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
^€^<'^^jfy

The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title AJ*/~
(b)

Excluded items.

The following items are specifically excluded from this sale st/&^*s£L

(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
j w j w e l l )^connected Oother
^electricity ^ c o n n e c t e d
<_29 public sewer ^ _ connected
68irrigation water 'secondary system
^ i n g r e s s & egress by private easement
j ^ s e p t i c tank ^"{connected
& other sanitary system.
<s of shares
Company
£J) dedicated road D paved
{Jfcpublic water ^ c o n n e c t e d
_ 3 TV antenna D master antenna D prewired
<5>curb and gutter
4& other rights .
^ n a t u r a l gas ^connected
flpnvate water ^[connected
(d)

Survey.

(e)

Buyer Inspection.

prior to closing, £ 1 shall not be furnished

A certified survey ^(shall be furnished at the expense of J? ^ AJL $L Z>

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical

condition, except

2

PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING

c

The total purchase price for the property t< —«<^—T-_r
Dollars (5

r£z.<£^+*~&C*-j>&r7V-u*

&>ej<=>oo

*&•

which shall be paid as follows

which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at __________ % per annum with monthly payments of $
which include

D principal

Q interest

D taxes

D insurance

Qcondo fees.

Dother

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
which include

Dprincipal

Ointerest,

Dtaxes

% per annum with monthly payments of $
Omsurance.

Qcondo fees.

representing balance, if any including proceeds from a new .
•

*

"^

*

Oother

____

. loan to be paid as follows

-

.£00000

*$*•/& 0G0

s</<y>t/~ £g'/Ztss"J>/fJ2*-£

TOTAL f*Wu,Acr
DR.rc
PURCHASE PRICE

g*Y£J£

/+*&

7*E

/ ^ a^stsiTf^j£^/&<is&/?

<<& £>sfy

{y^Losrs^c.

&*'

SV-.

me and
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and 'or procure same
a n d jt^is
p
offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and /or financing Buyer agrees to make application within .
days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed
If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing w i t h i n ;
at the option of the Buyer or
or Sellep'upon
Selle>upo written notice

%

days after Se'ler s acceptance of this Agreement this Agreement shall be voidable

pK/4

Seller agrees to pay $ f * /1L
towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs including but not limitea to loan discount points
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation on the oroaerty Section F shall apply
Page two of a four page form

Seller* s Initials (

y{

^ T

Date

2- " ^» '

;

7

Buyer's Initials ( U - ^ T t

Date

&rfaV(

» inni estate .-touudu imnsiH' O< bell»?r s owner«*t'»p mii^esi sr*an o** ma.n«* a«* set toun ••» s e u i o n o - ••• n^it- ... n, . . . v . ^ K > U <I».W .».«.*». IOW.C IM. C ^ w.c
property syb/ect to encumbrances and exceptio
>ted Herein evidenced by J<^a current policy of titlt
ira^~e in the amount of purchase p r i c e ^ a n abstract
)f title brought current wtth an attorney s opinio.
ee f D n H )
* 4 , I N S P E C T I O N OF T I T L E .
In accordance with Section G
3uyer'shall take title subject to any existing restrictive covenants
n i m o m CC & R s prior to signing this Agreement
5

V E S T I N G OF T I T L E .

Title shall vest m Buyer as follows

6

SELLER W A R R A N T I E S .

Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing
including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer O h a s ^ h a s not reviewed any condo-

v ^ ^

P / X l f t . T T " J>

S

DAy*

/*&&&.

r&

£j-*SS<+'&^

In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted

Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following

7

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS A N D CONTINGENCIES.

ae satisfied prior to closing

This offer is made subject to the following special conditions a n d / o r contingencies which must

SLS^f^s

*sV$~

8
C L O S I N G OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before
—
"
in
• — a t a reasonable location to be designated by
Seller, subject to Section Q Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance
with this Agreement

9

Prorations set forth in Section R. shall be made as of J^date of possession 0s^iate of ciosmg£?other

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on

10
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Agreement by reference
11

_ unless extended by written agreement of parties

Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this

A G R E E M E N T T O PURCHASE A N D T I M E L I M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE.

shall have . u n t i l .
EAF
/ -O
- - -y• f- •y- ^
. >"
*R(^yM
f e , Buyer
S iignaturtroT
g n a t u i w O TBt <
KJf y *eflV
' w- ^^^^ ~

s - ~ > ^
JZ^H^/'

/ Y TT-V7
/ / ,

Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions

to accept this offer
i l U ) ) X7

^_^___

\J
(
y^ [hY-*^v^
/ N ^ ^ ^ - ' ^ ^ Oy^
*^

' Date

Seller

Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the

I
Signature of Buyer

Date

CHECK O N E
D A C C E P T A N C E OF OFFER TO PURCHASE
D REJECTION

Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above

Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

IfeCCOUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in theattached Addendum, a n d
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until
specified
below
jjgf
^
%
scitiea oetow
/
0 *

*'C' **

(A M.t+

/

IvT)

/

•

J}~cH
s)

. 19 & L 2 L to accept the terms

/

/

//

6 r£<j-

Time

ZJJL

c^AM^M)
^

< ,> ^ * " < 1 » >
Signature of S
e
l
l

<
e

r

^
'

^
I

j

^

r~ZrV<r /
^
r
t * * ? * ^ ^

CHECK O N E

/<

O Buyer accepts the counter offer

,

vnrrrr.t ^a£&^:

•LBuyer accepts with modifications o n attached addendum

Time

(S-',}°

(AM-PM)

A \ P

Signature
^ n a t u r e of
ot Buyer
auyer

^ /) fj

/

< V ^ < ^r^S*-**,?-

^ /2sjzjrr*>

S

__»_*_-^-«r
'*%0' ^*?y

^

/yy/

/<?&£££

The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to

a commission of

$}

A<

*<JM~~

ytf s^

^ 7 r ' 1* ^ * ^ * r~ /

^ -?W~

Signature of Selrer

*r~*<-~r~j'7-2L.

^

as consic

^
-7-

^~<*~*+ ^T ^ ^ - ^ T / ^
y^^u^

yg*/?ox

^

2

t^ff-ST
COMMISSION.

*

g

4*Pi>£^

7~s*~t^i

y* c*S

Brokerage)

">w

^MlLl

1

Date

Signa

Date

OOCUMENTRECEIF
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement t

>t therefore

be completed)
A p j j a c k n o w l e d g e receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signan
S I G N A T U R E OF SELLER

3\Gt
Date
Date

/tc/w\.fl^*fc^^-z*s*^~

001-6-

Date

B ^ J personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be matted on
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to t h e ^ f S e l l e r D Buyer. Sent fr>y ^ S j . 1 , ^ ^
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Seller's Initials (

''MJ?u-?~?7

f A

^

|1 l u ^ r !.\

^ ^^^pfV

^

Buyer's Initials

J

19 K /

^

(VJu^TJ

by
^

)

Date fjA^

^ ^

•K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS
If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreemot onjts
behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
I
COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes and
cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no verbal agreements which modify
or affect this agreement This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties.
M
COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this
Aareement not expressly modified or excluded therein.
i/N
DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of gleiajuJ^Jky___SeHer. or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any
express condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit
shall be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney s fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest
money deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting
party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
0

ABROGATION.

Execution of a final real estate contract, if any. shall abrogate this Agreement.

P. RISK OF LOSS. A!i ris* o< loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property
between the date hereof and the oate of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or
replace damaged property prioi to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price
and Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed.
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport,
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing date shall
be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter,
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing date. "Closing'' shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed
and delivered by ail parties to the transaction.
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 17) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer,
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing.
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special
warranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the
said existing real estate contract therein.
T

AGENCY DISCLOSURE.

U.

BROKERAGE.

V

DAYS.

Selimg Erokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term
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Brokerage

shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office.

days shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
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APPENDIX 2

SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

.NC1S H. SETTER
?OY S. AXLANO
[NT R. ARMSTRONG
.WART M. H A N S O N , J R .
U A M L. P R A T E R
MO R. O L S E N
J C E T. J O N E S
»OLO G. O L O R O Y O
HARO J . LAWRENCE
».NCIS J . C A R N E Y
-IICHAEL H A N S E N
* L F. H U E F N E R
:HAEL W. HOMER
N W. ECAN
ED R. SILVESTER
ERIE P. SMANTEAU
:HAEL L. ALLEN
ARLES P. SAMPSON

A UTAH PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
S E V E N T H FLOOR
CLARK LEAMJNG O F F I C E C E N T E R
175 S O U T H WEST T E M P L E
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H

CABLE ADORESS:

SAXLAW

TELEX: 4 5 3 1 5 7
TELEC0P1ER:(80«)

532-7355

8-4IOI-I-480

T E L E P H O N E (SOl) 5 3 2 - 7 3 0 0
PARK CITY, UTAH
(SOI)

649-4000

September 22, 1987

HAND DELIVERED
Craig L. Taylor, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
4 00 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

First Security Mortgage Company/William Kelley
643 Snow Lane, Park City, Utah

Dear Mr. Taylor:
As we have discussed, this office represents William
Kelley, Jr. By date of September 4, 1987, you sent Mr. Kelley a
letter demanding that he must close on certain property located in
Park City, Utah on or before September 15, 1987. In that letter,
you advised Mr. Kelley that he should retain the services of an
attorney. The letter was sent over the Labor Day weekend and Mr.
Kelley was unable to contact our office until September 9, 1987.
He traveled to Utah immediately to meet with us and was here the
weekend following Labor Day.
Despite the offer in your letter that First Security
would cooperate in all ways with Mr. Kelley, that has not been
the case. First, Mr. Kelley has requested a reasonable time within
which to review the problem. First Security assumed the defense
of the action and sought to clear title to the property and the
water rights. On short notice and over a Labor Day weekend, First
Security attempted to give Mr. Kelley five business days within
which he must perform. Such was a totally unreasonable time based
upon the fact that First Security had been involved with the problem
for several months. Mr. Kelley could not travel to Utah and be
advised of the situation in five days. You offered to make your
files available, but this was not the case. Dan Egan went to your
office pursuant to an appointment to review the files. Apparently
because of a busy schedule, you were unable to meet with him.
Subsequently, we received a copy of the Complaint and Answer only.
We requested and were told we would be given copies of documents
relating to water and water rights. This is critical, as the

0060

Craig L. Taylor, Esq.
September 22, 1987
Page 2

Armstrongs have shut off the water which was in existence at the
time my client signed the Earnest Money. Nevertheless, those documents have not been forthcoming.
First Security Mortgage Company has totally frustrated
my client's ability to perform. It has placed unreasonable demands
on the time of performance and has deprived him of information
necessary to evaluate the status of the property for which First
Security undertook an action to clear title. The unreasonable
demands of First Security have placed an extreme hardship on my
client. The Earnest Money was signed on February 20, 1987. He
has marketed properties and incurred losses resulting from First
Security's delay in being able to close on the Agreement. These
losses are not less than $4,000 per month. Nevertheless, despite
these facts, First Security has acted in a most arbitrary and
unreasonable manner in this action and has attempted to frustrate
Mr. Kelley's performance under the contract.
My client hereby tenders the down payment owed pursuant
to the Earnest Money and Receipt to Purchase and all amendments
thereto. My calculation is that the down payment is to be $130,000;
$10,000 has earlier been placed in escrow which is to be a part of
the down payment, requiring payment of $120,000. As we have seen
no closing statements, notes, deeds or mortgages, we are uncertain
as to the exact amount of cash necessary to close. Therefore,
Mr. Kelley has wired $140,000 to Williamsburg Savings Bank to be
held in an account and applied to closing. This tender is conditioned only upon First Security honoring its obligations pursuant
to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and delivering the property
free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure. Mr. Kelley
further requests that First Security resolve the issue regarding
the water rights to the pond immediately in front of the home.
As you are aware, this pond was full and was marketed as a part
of the property. Through First Security's actions, the Armstrongs
acted to cut off the water and deprive Mr. Kelley of the water
rights. This problem needs to be resolved prior to closing so
that Mr. Kelley actually receives that for which he contracted.
The pond is essential to the aesthetics of the home and the property.
Although First Security has demanded a closing on September 22 and has refused to extend the closing for a reasonable
period to allow Mr. Kelley to inspect that with which First Security
has been involved for months, First Security still has not complied
with the contract and provided copies of the mortgage and promissory
notes which it seeks signed as a part of closing. It has not in
any sense complied with its obligations pursuant to the Agreement.
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As we earlier discussed, my client strongly desires to
purchase the property and will not knuckle under to First Security's
strong-arm tactics. We have filed this day an action seeking
declaratory judgment and an interpretation of the contract. Mr.
Kelley has asked the Court to interpret the propriety and fairness
of the positions asserted by First Security. We will also ask
the Court to determine if the strong-arm tactics of First Security
are merely an effort to drive my client away from property which
he has contracted to purchase, is capable of buying and wants as
a residence for he and his family so that the property can be sold
to others in a manner which will net a greater return to First
Security.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
Very truly yours,
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

David R. Olsen
db
cc:

Mr. William R. Kelley, Jr.
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